By according differential treatment to male and female members of the uniformed services for the sole purposes of achieving administrative convenience, the statutes are unconstitutionally discriminatory and violate the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment. Facts: Under a federal statute, a male serviceman may claim his wife as a dependant for benefits without regard to whether she is in fact dependant upon him for any part of her support. But a servicewoman has to actually prove that her husband is dependent upon her for support. Issue: Does this statute violate the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment? Holding: Yes Rationale: Women in our country have suffered from a history of discrimination and prejudice and discrimination still exists in our nation. Furthermore, sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic. Therefore, classifications based on sex are inherently suspect and deserve the application of the strict scrutiny. According to the Court, the mere administrative convenience, which this statute achieves, is not compelling enough to survive strict scrutiny. Therefore, this statute violates the DPC of the 5th Amendment.
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside for remedial purposes, it must first be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts have been a substantial cause of inter-district segregation - the remedy ordered by the court would impose on the outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitution violation, a wholly impermissible remedy not hinted at by other past decisions of this court
Facts (Dred Scott) is slave sold to Sanford (D) by Emerson. Emerson took P from Missouri (slave state) to Illinois (free state) and to Louisiana Territory (free), then back to Missouri (slave). P argues that he becomes a free citizen by way of his travel through Illinois and also his time in a free territory. (He also argues that his family was free by way of Louisiana Territory). Procedural History: Scott won his freedom at trial court but the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded. He lost and appealed to the Supreme Court. Issues 1. Did the Circuit Court have jurisdiction to hear the case? a. Article III Section 2 says that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in cases where there are citizens of two different states. b. But, is P a citizen? 2. If the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, was the judgment given in error or not? Holding Slaves were not intended to be included under the word “citizens” in the Constitution and thus can claim none of those rights. Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution and therefore is not entitled to sue. Neither Dred Scott nor his family was made free by being carried into Illinois. Three issues to decide if court has jurisdiction: (broad to narrow) Can any African American (free or slave) be a citizen? i. Who were recognized as citizens when the Constitution was adopted (was the general term “citizen” in the Constitution meant to include slaves or was it just taken as a matter of fact that slaves were property)? ii. just answering this question “no” would have taken care of the issue- alth ough very broadly b. Is the Missouri Compromise constitutional? Did Congress have authority to make that state free? (to see if he becomes a citizen by way of Missouri) i. Sanford claims that the Compromise is unconstitutional Upper Louisiana is made free by the Missouri Compromise, but that means 1. if you bring your slave into Upper Louisiana, you’ll be deprived of your property. Therefore, the Missouri Compromise is supposedly unconstitutional under the 5th Amendment Due Process Law. “No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process.” 2. BUT ignorance of the law isn’t an excuse. You should have known that the area was free. if you bring a machine gun into NY, that gun can be taken away from you without violating your due process law. 3. answering just this question would have only decided the issue of whether the family was free, because Scott has Illinois as a claim, which had the right to be free regardless of the Missouri Compromise c. What is the effect of Missouri law on the removal? Who decides what the effect of going into a free area is? Does Missouri law decide that? Or another state’s law? i. Did Dred Scott become free by being taken by owner to a place where slavery could not by law exist (Rock Island, Illinois) and upon his return to Missouri thus became a citizen of that state? ii. This narrow question is at the heart of the issue, and answering this question could have resolved all of it. Instead they issued a broad opinion about whether or not Africans can be citizens. Judgment Judgment for the defendant is reversed; mandate issued directing the suit to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Reasoning 1) Plain language 1. In Scott the court breezed by the plain language of “we the people” 2) Legislative history 1. All colonies except Maine gave African-Americans less rights (couldn’t vote) means that women and children were not citizens either 3) Other constitutional provisions 1. Two clauses that suggest slaves were meant to be property: a. the right to import slaves –but this was only until 1808 b. the pledge to uphold the rights of the master and return to him any property that might have escaped 2. One problem with other provisions: might reflect a compromise between 2. BUT if a restriction on voting means that you’re not a citizen, then that two different groups and may not tell us anything directly about the thoughts of the framers. 4) Precedent 1. If the Constitution intended for slaves to be citizens, why is it that even after the drafting of the Constitution, slaves were still treated as if they had no rights? 5) Specific intent 1. In Scott there was no history of debate during the Constitution or history of debated on an amendment (these would be the best sources). Instead, relied on what people, in general, thought at the time. *neither slaves nor their decedents are citizens of the United States in terms of the Federal Constitution—even if D. Scott was a citizen of MO he would not be considered a citizen under the Constitution * strikes down the Missouri Compromise as unconstitutional based on 5th Amendment Takings Clause violation—leads to the Kansas/Nebraska Act * Court takes an extremely passive stance * 14th Amendment overturned Dred Scott by declaring that all persons “born or naturalized in the United States…are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” It also guarantees that no state shall deprive any citizen of the privileges or immunities of citizenship, or deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or to deny any person “equal protection of the laws.”
Facts: • Police entered the private residence of Plaintiff in response to a reported weapons disturbance. • Police walked in on Defendant and another man, Tyron Garner engaging in sodomy. • The police arrested the two petitioners under a Texas penal statute that makes it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. • Petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo, they lost the case. They then entered a plea of nolo contendere and were fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25. • The Court of Appeals rejected their constitutional arguments under Bowers. • The US Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue: • Is the Texas statute banning two persons of the same sex to engage in intimate sexual conduct unconstitutional under the Equal Protections clause of the 14th Amendment because it does not ban the same sexual conduct between people of different sexes? • Is the same statute unconstitutional under the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment because it violates general liberty and privacy of two consenting adults in their own home? • Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) be overturned? Holding: Decision was reversed on basis of the statute is a violation to the petitioners right to exercise liberty of private conduct under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Further, a concurrence stated that the statute was in violation of the Equal Protections Clause of the 14th Amendment because the statute singled out homosexuals as a class and placed them in a situation by which a conduct closely associated with that class was deemed criminal. Bowers v. Hardwick was overturned.
Court upholds a minimum wage law for women and children in Washington State - the Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the depravation of liberty without due process of law. - The legislature of the state was clearly entitled to consider the situation of women in employment, the fact that they are in the class receiving the least pay, that their bargaining power is relatively weak, and that they are the ready victims of those who would take advantage of their necessitous circumstances. The legislature was entitled to adopt measures to reduce the evils of the “sweating system” that exploits workers at wages so low as to be insufficient to meet the bare cost of living - The community may direct is law-making power to correct the abuse which springs from their selfish disregard of the public interest
Court upholds a minimum wage law for women and children in Washington State - the Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the depravation of liberty without due process of law. - The legislature of the state was clearly entitled to consider the situation of women in employment, the fact that they are in the class receiving the least pay, that their bargaining power is relatively weak, and that they are the ready victims of those who would take advantage of their necessitous circumstances. The legislature was entitled to adopt measures to reduce the evils of the “sweating system” that exploits workers at wages so low as to be insufficient to meet the bare cost of living - The community may direct is law-making power to correct the abuse which springs from their selfish disregard of the public interest
14th Amendment legislation can waive states’ immunity, but it only supports “remedial” legislation, and the remedy has to be “congruent and proportional” to the harm. Without legislative findings establishing a history of state violation of the free exercise clause, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was not remedial but substantive, and thus was struck down because it gave more protection to religious observance than the Court found constitutionally required.
4th Am. does apply to housing and code inspections. Although inspectors were not required to have warrants, some kind of PC was necessary. Ct. adopts “flexible probable cause.” This standard is based on reasonableness? weighing the gov’t interest against the individual’s privacy interest ? this leads to the adoption of administrative search warrants - state must show that reasonable legislative or adm. standards for conducting an area inspect are satisfied w/ respect to a particular dwelling. - warrants not going to look like trad. search warrants; only going to make sure “neutral and detached magistrate” approves warrant, moving away from PC; inspectors not ltd to certain areas were PC exists, can look anywhere, anytime
- police were trained to question suspects outside of Miranda first, to get a confession, then Mirandize them, and then get the statement again. - D made an incriminating statement in an interrogation outside of Miranda, and then the police Mirandized her and waited until they got a full confession that mirrored her prior statements - Court determined that were there was a deliberate effort to evade Miranda as to statement and to employ this technique to get a second statement- Miranda warnings won’t necessarily break the taint. o Reasoning for decision that Miranda doesn’t break the taint in this situation is that the function of the Miranda warnings can’t be carried out. The warning can’t be effective in this situation to make the 2nd statement voluntary within the meaning of Miranda. (the warnings could not be understood to dispel coercion). o Seems like if you were advising a cop engaged in questioning outside Miranda and another cops wants to re-question- you’d need to advise them that taint needs to be dissipated and merely re-Mirandizing might not be enough. Cops need to change circumstances enough to make it look like a separate interrogation. (don’t use first statement to impeach 2nd statement, change time and place of interrogation, change officer interrogating, advise ? that first statement won’t be admissible in court)—all done to assure ? is not compelled and statement is given voluntarily. o So now we have a majority of the ct. saying police officer’s intent matters - Plurality (4 votes): D’s Miranda warnings failed for statement 2. Basis is on the D’s subjective intent that having made the prior statement will effect their second one, it is based on whether D understood the Miranda warnings. - Kennedy (5th vote): wants to add a subjective intent of the police officer test when determining the legality of the statements. Where there is a deliberate violation, Miranda warnings alone will not break the taint o Kennedy’s Concurrence appears to be controlling (but majority doesn’t want officer’s intent to matter) – Must have bad faith (deliberately evasion of Miranda) on part of officers for it to not break taint - Breyer: the court should apply a fruit of the poisonous tree approach to these issues but allow for a good faith exception (for situations like Elstadt) - Dissent (O’Connor): this is the same inquiry as Elstadt, but the focus is on the be on D’s understanding of Miranda, and not on the police intent o 7 votes say police intent is not relevant o 2 votes say police intent is relevant
if the statement is made inside the home the Brown factors are used. Once you get down to the stationhouse however, if there was probable cause for the arrest and you made a statement, Miranda warnings are enough to break the taint o this is because Harris was not unlawfully in custody when he was removed to the station
Wednesday, June 9, 2010
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